Inquiry+and+education

=== Below are the quote choices for the Inquiry and Education Section of the book. Feel free to add additional quotes. We've noted which quotes have been selected within the table. If you see a quote you would like to use that has not been selected, then please put your name in the respondent column and then email us to let us know which quote you have selected. Thank you. ===

Current number of additional entries possible in this section: **4**
=Inquiry and Education=


 * **Item** || **Quote** || **Source** || **Respondent** ||
 * IE1 || An unseen power controlling out destiny becomes the power of the ideal. . . The artists, scientist, parent, as far as they are actuated by the spirit of their callings, are controlled by the unseen. For all endeavor for the better is moved by faith in what is possible, not by adherence to the actual. || //A Common Faith//, p. 23. || Garrison ||
 * IE2 || If one is not able to estimate wisely what is relevant to the interpretation of a given perplexing or doubtful issue, it avails little that arduous learning has built up a large stock of concepts. For learning is not wisdom; information does not guarantee good judgment. Memory may provide an antiseptic refrigerator in which to store a stock of meanings for future use, but judgment selects and adopts the one used in a given emergency – and without emergency. . . there is no call for judgment. || //How We Think//, p. 106-107. ||  ||
 * IE3 || To engage in inquiry is like entering a contract. It commits the inquirer to observance of certain conditions. || //Logic: The Theory of Inquiry//, p. 24. ||  ||
 * IE4 || Love for security, translated into a desire not to be disturbed and unsettled, leads to dogmatism, to acceptance to beliefs upon authority, to intolerance and fanaticism on one side and to irresponsible dependence and sloth on the other. || //The Quest for Certainty//, p. 181-182 ||  ||
 * IE5 || When theories of values do not afford intellectual assistance in framing ideas and beliefs about values that are adequate to direct action, the gap must be filled by other means. If intelligent method is lacking, prejudice, the pressure of immediate circumstance, self-interest, traditional customs, institutions of accidental historic origin, are //not// lacking, and they tend to take the place of intelligence. || //The Quest for Certainty//, p. 211-212 ||  ||
 * IE6 || Any belief as such is tentative, hypothetical; it is not just to be acted upon, but is to be framed with reference to its office as a guide to action. Consequently, it should be the last thing in the world to be picked up casually and clung to rigidly. || //The Quest for Certainty//, p. 221. ||  ||

"Any idea that ignores the necessary role of intelligence in the production of works of art is based upon identification of thinking with use of one special kind of material. . . the production of a work of genuine art probably demands more intelligence than does most of the so-called thinking that goes on among those who pride themselves on being 'intellectuals'" (Art as Experience, 52). Eisner


 * **Item** || **Quote** || **Source** || **Respondent** ||
 * IE7 || Men still want the crutch of dogma, of beliefs fixed by authority, to relieve them of the trouble of thinking and the responsibility of directing their activity by thought. They tend to confine their own thinking to a consideration of which one among the rival systems of dogma they accept. Hence the schools are better adapted, as John Stuart Mill said, to make disciples than inquirers. || //Democracy and Education//, p. 339 || Wraga ||
 * IE8 || Belief culminates; the original isolated facts have been woven into a coherent fabric. || //How We Think//, p. 83 ||  ||
 * IE9 || Truly practical men give their minds free play about a subject without asking too closely at every point for the advantage to be gained; exclusive preoccupation with matters of use and application so narrows the horizon as in the long run to defeat itself. It does not pay to tether one’s thoughts to the post of use with too short a rope. Power in action requires some largeness and imaginativeness of vision. || //How We Think//, p. 139 ||  ||
 * IE10 || To fill our heads, like a scrapbook, with this and that item as a finished and done-for thing, is not to think. It is to turn ourselves into a piece of registering apparatus. To consider the //bearing// of the occurrence upon what may be, but is not yet, is to think. || //Democracy and Education//, p. 147 ||  ||
 * IE11 || The mind is no longer a spectator beholding the world from without and finding its highest satisfaction in the joy of self-sufficing contemplation. The mind is within the world as part of the latter’s own ongoing process. || //Quest for Certainty//, p. 232 ||  ||
 * IE12 || “Thought” is not a property of something termed intellect or reason apart from nature. It is a mode of directed overt action. Ideas are anticipatory plans and designs which take effect in concrete reconstructions of antecedent conditions of existence. || //Quest for Certainty//, p. 133 ||  ||
 * IE13 || Taking what is already known or pointing to it is mo more a case of knowledge than taking a chisel out of a toolbox is the making of the tool. || //Quest for Certainty//, p. 150 ||  ||


 * **Item** || **Quote** || **Source** || **Respondent** ||
 * IE14 || But the open mind is a nuisance if it is merely passively open to allow anything to find its way into a vacuous mind behind the opening. It is significant only as it is the mark of an actively searching mind, one on the alert for further knowledge and understanding. || “Education and the Social Order,” in //The Later Works//, Vol. 9, p. 181 ||  ||
 * IE15 || More particularly, the conclusions of prior knowledge are the instruments of new inquiries, not the norm which determines their validity. Objects of previous knowledge supply working hypotheses for new situations; they are the source of suggestion of new operations; they direct inquiry. || //The Quest for Certainty//, p. 149. ||  ||
 * IE16 || The ancient myth of Tantalus and his effort to drink the water before him seems to be ingeniously prophetic of modern epistemology. The thirstier, the needier of truth the human mind, and the intenser the efforts put forth to slake itself in the ocean of being just beyond the edge of consciousness, the more surely the living waters of truth recede! || //Beliefs and Existences,//(in //The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and other Essays//) p. 186 ||  ||
 * IE17 || Knowledge is not just something which we are now conscious of, but consists of the dispositions we consciously use in understanding what now happens. Knowledge as an act is bringing some of our dispositions to consciousness with a view to straightening out a perplexity, by conceiving the connection between ourselves and the world in which we live. || //Democracy and Education//, p. 344. ||  ||
 * IE18 || Imagination of ideal ends pertinent to actual conditions represents the fruition of a disciplined mind. || //A Common Faith//, p. 35. || Cunningham ||
 * IE19 || The indispensable necessity is that there be some kind of vital current flowing between the field worker and the research worker. Without this flow, the latter is not able to judge the real scope of the problem to which he addresses himself. || //The Sources of a Science of Education//, p. 44. ||  ||


 * **Item** || **Quote** || **Source** || **Respondent** ||
 * IE20 || Command of scientific methods and systematized subject-matter liberates individuals. It enables them to see new problems, devise new procedures, and, in general, makes for diversification rather than for set uniformity. But at the same time these diversifications have a cumulative effect in the advance shared by all workers in the field. || //The Sources of a Science of Education//, p. 12-13. ||  ||
 * IE21 || Theory is in the end, as has been well said, the most practical of all things, because this widening of range of attention beyond nearby purpose and desire eventually results in the creation of wider and father-reaching purposes. || //The Sources of a Science of Education//, p. 17. || Seals ||
 * IE22 || Until educators get the independence and courage to insist that educational aims are to be formed as well as executed within the educative process, they will not come to consciousness of their own function. Others then will have no great respect for educators because educators do not respect their own social place and work. || //The Sources of a Science of Education//, p. 74. || Hickman ||
 * IE23 || Plato somewhere speaks of the slave as one who in his actions does not express his own ideas, but those of some other man. It is our social problem now, even more urgent than in the time of Plato, that method, purpose, understanding, shall exist in the consciousness of the one who does the work, that his activity shall have meaning to himself. || //The School and Society//, p. 23. ||  ||
 * IE24 || I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historic cud long since reduced to woody fibre, or an apologetics for lost causes (lost to natural science), or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America’s own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action. || //The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy//, p. 68. ||  ||
 * IE25 || Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men. || //The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy//, 68. ||  ||
 * IE26 || For any theory and set of practices is dogmatic which is not based upon critical examination of its own underlying principles. || //Experience and Education//, p. 23 ||  ||


 * **Item** || **Quote** || **Source** || **Respondent** ||
 * IE28 || A conscious setting forth of the method logically adapted for reaching an end is possible only after the result has first been reached by more unconscious and tentative methods, while it is valuable only when a review of the method that achieved success in a given case will throw light upon a new, similar case. . . But because teachers find that the things which they themselves best understand are marked off and defined in clear-cut ways, our school room are pervaded with the superstition that children are to begin with already crystallized formulae or method. || //How We Think//, p. 113-114. ||  ||
 * IE29 || In memorizing this simulated cut and dried copy of the logic of an adult, the child generally is induced to stultify his own subtle and vital logical movement. The adoption by teachers of this misconception of logical method has probably done more than anything else to bring pedagogy into disrepute; for too many persons “pedagogy” means precisely a set of mechanical, self-conscious devices for replacing by some cast-iron external scheme the personal mental movement of the individual. || //How We Think//, p. 60-61. ||  ||
 * IE30 || Genuine ignorance is more profitable because it is likely to be accompanied by humility, curiosity, and open-mindedness, while ability to repeat catch-phrases, cant terms, familiar propositions, gives the conceit of learning and coats the mind with a varnish waterproof to new ideas. || //How We Think//, p. 177. ||  ||
 * IE31 || As long as the isolation of knowledge and practice holds sway, this division of aims and dissipation of energy of which the state of education is typical, will persist. The effective condition of the integration of all divided purposes and conflicts of belief is the realization that intelligent action is the sole ultimate resource of mankind in every field whatsoever. || //The Quest for Certainty//, p. 201. ||  ||


 * **Item** || **Quote** || **Source** || **Respondent** ||
 * IE 32 || Truth is a collection of truths; and these constituent truths are in the keeping of the best available methods of inquiry and testing as to matters of fact; methods, which are, when collected under a single name, science. As to truth, then, philosophy has no pre-eminent status; it is a recipient, not a donor. || //Experience and Nature,// p. 332. ||  ||
 * IE 33 || To //perceive// is to acknowledge unattained possibilities; it is to refer the present to consequences, apparition to issue, and thereby behave in deference to the //connections// of events. || //Experience and Nature,// p. 151 ||  ||
 * IE 34 || But when one neglects the connection of these scientific objects with the affairs of primary experience, the result is a picture of a world of things indifferent to human interests because it is wholly apart from experience. It is more than merely isolated, for it is set in opposition. Hence when it is viewed as fixed and final in itself it is a source of oppression to the heart and paralysis to imagination. || //Experience and Nature,// p. 13 ||  ||

"Let us admit the case of the conservative; if we once start thinking, no one can guarantee where we shall come out, except that many objects, ends and institutions are surely doomed. Every thinker puts some portion of an apparently stable world in peril and no one can wholly predict what will emerge in its place" (//Experience and Nature//, 182). Keeler